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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici curiae are law professors who have studied
the history of the dual sovereignty doctrine. The
purpose of this brief is to provide the Court with additional historical information that will be useful in
reconsidering dual sovereignty. 1
Stuart Banner is the Norman Abrams Distinguished Professor of Law at UCLA.
Paul G. Cassell is the Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law and the University
Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of
Utah.
Anthony Colangelo is the Gerald J. Ford Research
Fellow and a Professor of Law at SMU.
Evan Lee is Emeritus Professor of Law at UC
Hastings.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner’s brief demonstrates that there was no
dual sovereignty doctrine before the mid-19th century. At the Founding and for several decades thereafter, a prosecution by one sovereign was understood
to bar a subsequent prosecution by all other sovereigns. Dual sovereignty is thus contrary to the original meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Defendants today enjoy a weaker form of double jeopardy
protection than they did when the Bill of Rights was
ratified.

No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person other than amici made a monetary contribution
intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.
Both parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
1
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But that fact only raises three further questions.
First why did the Court erroneously conclude in
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 131 (1959), that the
English and early American sources are “totally inconclusive” as to whether dual sovereignty existed at
the Founding? Second, how, when, and why did the
dual sovereignty doctrine come to exist? Third, given
this history, why did the Court hold in United States
v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922), that a state prosecution does not bar a subsequent federal prosecution
for the same conduct? This brief will answer these
questions.
First, in Bartkus the Court simply misunderstood
the English and early American sources.
Second, dual sovereignty grew out of the intense
controversy over slavery in the period immediately
before the Civil War. The Court invented dual sovereignty largely to prevent free states from blocking
the recapture of fugitive slaves.
Third, by the time of Lanza, the dual sovereignty
doctrine had been restated so often that the original
meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause had been
forgotten. In Lanza, in any event, the Court was less
concerned with original meaning than with rampant
disregard for Prohibition. One purpose of dual sovereignty was to prevent “wet” localities from nullifying
the Volstead Act.
In short, dual sovereignty is an accident of history. It was not part of the constitutional design.
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ARGUMENT
Dual sovereignty is an accident of history; it
was not part of the constitutional design.
A. In Bartkus v. Illinois, the Court misunderstood the English and early American
sources relevant to the origin of dual
sovereignty.
The Court has examined the early sources relevant to the origin of dual sovereignty on only one occasion. In Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959),
the Court devoted two paragraphs to the early
sources, and concluded that the historical record is
“totally inconclusive” as to whether dual sovereignty
existed at the Founding. Id. at 131. This conclusion
is mistaken. It rests on two major errors.
First, the Court refused even to consider the English cases, R. v. Roche, 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (Cr. Cas.
1775), and R. v. Hutchinson (1678) (which is described in Roche, 168 Eng. Rep. at 169 n.a, and in
several other cases). The Court simply ignored
Roche. As for the cases describing Hutchinson, the
Court asserted that they are “dubious”—in part because they exist in different reported versions, and
in part because “they reflect a power of discretion
vested in English judges not relevant to the constitutional law of our federalism.” Bartkus, 359 U.S. at
128 n.9.
Neither of these claims stands up to scrutiny.
Roche exists in only one reported version.
Hutchinson is indeed described slightly differently
by different reporters, but every version says that a
prosecution by one sovereign bars a subsequent
prosecution by another. See Beak v. Thyrwhit, 87
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Eng. Rep. 124, 125 (K.B. 1688); Beak v. Tyrrell, 89
Eng. Rep. 411, 411 (K.B. 1688); Beake v. Tirrell, 90
Eng. Rep. 379, 380 (K.B. 1688); Burrows v. Jemino,
93 Eng. Rep. 815, 815 (K.B. 1727); Burroughs v. Jamineau, 25 Eng. Rep. 235, 236 (Ch. 1727).
And the cases do not reflect any discretion vested
in English judges. They state a clear rule of law barring a subsequent prosecution. Had the Court been
able to consider the English treatises along with the
cases, the Court would have learned that the rule
declared in the cases was repeated uniformly by
commentators. See John Strange, A Collection of Select Cases Relating to Evidence 145 (1754); Henry
Bathurst, The Theory of Evidence 39 (1761); 2 Timothy Cunningham, The Merchant’s Lawyer 113
(1768); Francis Buller, An Introduction to the Law
Relative to Trials at Nisi Prius 346 (1768); Leonard
MacNally, The Rules of Evidence on Pleas of the
Crown 428 (1802); 1 Thomas Starkie, A Treatise on
Criminal Pleading 301 n.h (1814); 1 Joseph Chitty,
A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 458 (1816).
There was nothing dubious about it.
Second, the Bartkus Court misinterpreted Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820). In Houston, the
Court considered the possibility that a defendant
might be tried twice for the same conduct, once by a
state court and again by a federal court. The Court
concluded that “if the jurisdiction of the two Courts
be concurrent, the sentence of either Court, either of
conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of
the prosecution before the other.” Id. at 31. In
Bartkus, the Court erroneously concluded that Houston’s reaffirmation of the traditional oneprosecution rule was meant to apply only in the unu-
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sual circumstance in which a state imposed criminal
sanctions for a violation of a federal criminal law,
not in the more common circumstance in which a
state imposed sanctions for a violation of its own
criminal law. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 130 (referring to
Houston, 18 U.S. at 28). In fact, Houston included no
such limitation. The Pennsylvania statute at issue in
Houston, which prohibited desertion from the militia, was worded similarly to the federal statute prohibiting desertion, Houston, 18 U.S. at 28, but, as
the Houston Court correctly understood, Pennsylvania was enforcing one of its own criminal statutes,
not the similarly-worded federal statute.
The Court’s mistake in Bartkus is readily understandable. The purpose of Pennsylvania’s desertion
statute was to help the federal government punish
deserters, at a time when the federal government
was still quite weak. To achieve that end, the Pennsylvania statute was “in substance, a re-enactment
of the acts of Congress, as to the description of the
offence.” Id. Houston accordingly explained that the
purpose of the Pennsylvania statute was “to confer
authority upon a State Court Martial to enforce the
laws of the United States against delinquent militia
men.” Id. But by using the phrase “to enforce the
laws of the United States,” the Houston Court did
not literally mean that Pennsylvania was enforcing a
federal statute. Rather, the Court meant that Pennsylvania had added its enforcement efforts to those
of the federal government, just as would be the case
with similarly-worded state and federal statutes today.
Had the Barkus Court been able to consult early
American treatises, it would have learned that Hou-
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ston was uniformly understood to mean that a prosecution by one sovereign would bar a subsequent
prosecution by a second sovereign. James Kent’s
Commentaries on American Law, first published in
1826, was the leading general treatise in the country. Kent discussed Houston at length. He explained
that state and federal courts had concurrent jurisdiction in criminal cases, and that “the sentence of either court, whether of conviction or acquittal, might
be pleaded in bar of the prosecution before the other.” 1 James Kent, Commentaries on American Law
374 (1826). In this respect, Kent noted, criminal cases were just like civil cases, in that “the judgment of
a state court, in a civil case of concurrent jurisdiction, might be pleaded in bar of an action for the
same cause instituted in a circuit court of the United
States.” Id.
Specialized treatises declared the same rule. See
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the
United States of America 191 (1825); Thomas Sergeant, Constitutional Law 278 (2d ed. 1830); Edward
D. Mansfield, The Political Grammar of the United
States 137 (1835); Francis Wharton, A Treatise on
the Criminal Law of the United States 137 (1846);
Francis Wharton, A Treatise on the Law of Homicide
in the United States 283 (1855).
The Bartkus Court thus erred in concluding that
there was nothing to be learned from a review of the
English and early American sources. The Court has
not reviewed them since.
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B. Dual sovereignty was invented by this
Court shortly before the Civil War, largely as a way of preventing free states from
blocking the recapture of fugitive slaves.
This Court abandoned the traditional oneprosecution rule shortly before the Civil War, in
three cases decided between 1847 and 1852: Fox v.
Ohio, 46 U.S. 410 (1847), United States v. Marigold,
50 U.S. 560 (1850), and Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13
(1852). The primary reason appears to have been the
concern that dual sovereignty would allow free
states to thwart the recapture of fugitive slaves.
Fox was a state counterfeiting case in which the
defendant argued that the federal government’s
power to punish counterfeiting was exclusive, not
concurrent. In support of this argument, the defendant’s lawyer posited the absurd consequences that he
argued would flow from concurrent state and federal
jurisdiction. “[I]f the power be concurrent,” he pointed out, “[t]he weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the doctrine, that a conviction in either court
is a bar to a prosecution in the other.” Fox, 46 U.S. at
429. Whichever sovereign went first, the other sovereign would be prevented from prosecuting, which
meant that a state could take power away from the
federal government by getting to court faster. “Both
the legislative and judicial powers of the United
States are thus rendered abortive,” he argued—the
legislative power because Congress’s statute could
not be enforced, and the judicial power because the
federal courts would be sidelined by the state prosecution. Id. at 430.
This argument highlighted a potential problem
with the traditional rule, which was that it allowed a
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state to effectively nullify federal policy by racing to
the courthouse and depriving the federal government of its power to prosecute. This would not be a
problem in the area of counterfeiting, as there were
no states with a policy of favoring counterfeiting or
shielding counterfeiters from the federal government. In most areas of criminal law, the federal government likewise had little reason to worry that a
state might attempt to subvert federal policy. But
there was one very big exception—slavery.
There was already considerable controversy between the North and the South over slavery. Much of
the controversy concerned the efforts of northern
states to protect runaway slaves from being captured
and returned to slavery. Timothy S. Huebner, Liberty & Union: The Civil War Era and American Constitutionalism 59-61 (2016). The federal Fugitive Slave
Act of 1793 made it a criminal offense to obstruct the
capture of a fugitive slave, 1 Stat. 302, 305 (1793),
but some northern states, including Pennsylvania,
enacted statutes prohibiting the capture of fugitive
slaves, in a deliberate effort to nullify the effect of
the Fugitive Slave Act. In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41
U.S. 539 (1842), the Court put an end to this nullification strategy, by holding that the Fugitive Slave
Act preempted Pennsylvania’s statute. Abolitionists
needed an alternative strategy.
The parade of horribles imagined by Fox’s counsel,
soon after Prigg, was almost certainly a thinly-veiled
reference to slavery. If a state prosecution barred a
subsequent federal prosecution, a state wishing to
protect fugitive slaves had an obvious alternative to
the kind of statute Prigg had rendered off-limits. Instead of prohibiting the capture of fugitive slaves,
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the state could prohibit the harboring of fugitive
slaves. If the penalty was slight, or if the defendant
could expect to be pardoned by the state governor,
abolitionists harboring fugitive slaves would willingly surrender to state authorities. Once they were
“prosecuted” in state court, they would be immunized from federal prosecution. The federal Fugitive
Slave Act would be rendered toothless.
In Fox the Court thus expressed its first doubts
about the traditional one-prosecution rule. “It is almost certain,” the Court noted, “that, in the benignant spirit in which the institutions both of the State
and federal systems are administered, an offender
who should have suffered the penalties denounced
by the one would not be subjected a second time to
punishment by the other for acts essentially the
same, unless indeed this might occur in instances of
peculiar enormity, or where the public safety demanded extraordinary rigor.” Fox, 46 U.S. at 435.
The Court was suggesting that the one-prosecution
rule was a matter of government grace rather than a
strict rule of law, and that the rule could be suspended in extreme cases. The Court did not say what
those extreme cases would look like, but it was most
likely envisioning the circumstances that Fox’s lawyer had imagined, cases in which a free state was
intentionally subverting the Fugitive Slave Act. “But
were a contrary course of policy and action either
probable or usual,” the Court concluded—i.e., were
double prosecutions to become the norm—“this
would by no means justify the conclusion, that offences falling within the competency of different authorities to restrain or punish them would not
properly be subjected to the consequences which
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those authorities might ordain and affix to their perpetration.” Id. That is, regardless of whether double
prosecution was likely or unlikely, it was lawful.
Justice McLean defended the traditional oneprosecution rule in a lengthy dissent. “[T]o punish
the same act by the two governments would violate,
not only the common principles of humanity, but
would be repugnant to the nature of both governments,” he insisted. “There is no principle better established by the common law, none more fully recognized in the federal and State constitutions, than
that an individual shall not be put in jeopardy twice
for the same offence.” Id. at 439 (McLean, J., dissenting).
The Court took its second step toward dual sovereignty two years later, in United States v. Marigold.
Marigold was the inverse of Fox: the defendant had
been convicted of counterfeiting in federal court, and
he argued that state jurisdiction over counterfeiting
was exclusive. The Court dispensed with this argument unanimously in a short opinion. Toward the
end, the Court characterized Fox as having stated
that “the same act might, as to its character and
tendencies, and the consequences it involved, constitute an offence against both the State and Federal
governments, and might draw to its commission the
penalties denounced by either.” Marigold, 50 U.S. at
569.
Moore v. Illinois, the third case, involved a state
conviction for harboring a fugitive slave, and was
thus exactly the kind of case that raised worries
about allowing a state prosecution to bar a subsequent federal prosecution. The defendant was the
prominent Illinois abolitionist Richard Eells. (Eells
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died while the case was pending; Moore was his executor.) Eells was the president of the Illinois AntiSlavery Party and the party’s candidate for governor
in 1846. He lived in Quincy, just a few blocks from
the Mississippi River, across which lay the slave
state of Missouri. His house was the first stop on the
Underground Railroad for slaves escaping from Missouri. Eells was caught trying to hide a slave named
Charley, who had swum across the river. He was
convicted under state law of harboring a fugitive
slave. 2
The case attracted a great deal of attention, because of the intense controversy surrounding the
question of how much power free states possessed to
regulate the capture of fugitive slaves. Eells was
represented by Salmon Chase, the future Chief Justice. Chase was then a Senator and one of the most
well-known abolitionists in the country. He relied on
Prigg to argue that federal jurisdiction with respect
to fugitive slaves was exclusive, on the theory that if
states lacked the power to impede the return of fugitive slaves to their owners, states should also lack
the power to promote the return of fugitive slaves by
prosecuting those who helped the slaves escape.
Moore, 55 U.S. at 14-15.
As part of Chase’s argument that only the federal
government had the power to punish the harboring
of fugitive slaves, he contended that federal jurisdiction had to be exclusive, or else a person might be
unconstitutionally punished twice for the same offense. Id. at 19. But the issue of fugitive slaves preNational Park Service, Dr. Richard Eells
https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/underground/il3.htm.
2

House,
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sented the worst possible context for invoking the
traditional one-prosecution rule. The difficulty with
the rule was that it could empower a state to nullify
federal policy by beating the federal government to
the courthouse, and slavery was the one area in
which states clearly would make that attempt if they
could. 3
The Court thus had an especially pressing policy
reason in Moore v. Illinois to reject Chase’s invocation of the one-prosecution rule. The Court addressed the issue at length. “An offence, in its legal
signification, means the transgression of a law,” the
Court began.
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory. He may be said to
owe allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be
liable to punishment for an infraction of the
laws of either. The same act may be an offence
or transgression of the laws of both. Thus, an
assault upon the marshal of the United States,
and hindering him in the execution of legal
process, is a high offence against the United
States, for which the perpetrator is liable to
punishment; and the same act may also be a
gross breach of the peace of the State, a riot,
assault, or a murder, and subject the same person to a punishment, under the State laws, for
a misdemeanor or felony. That either or both
may (if they see fit) punish such an offender,
cannot be doubted. Yet it cannot be truly
The recently-enacted Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, like its 1793
predecessor, made it a federal crime to obstruct the recapture
of a fugitive slave, 9 Stat. 462, 464 (1850), so it did not change
anyone’s incentive in this respect.
3
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averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one
act he has committed two offences, for each of
which he is justly punishable. He could not
plead the punishment by one in bar to a conviction by the other.
Id. at 19-20. In this passage, the Court made clear
that northern states could not nullify the Fugitive
Slave Act by conducting sham prosecutions of their
own. To do so, however, the Court had to elaborate a
dual sovereignty doctrine that was exactly the opposite of the way the Double Jeopardy Clause had been
understood since the Founding.
C. In United States v. Lanza, the Court was
concerned less with the original meaning
of the Double Jeopardy Clause than with
rampant disregard of Prohibition.
In subsequent years, when the issue arose, the
Court did not discuss or cite Houston or Furlong, its
pair of 1820 cases stating that a prosecution by one
sovereign would bar a subsequent prosecution by all
others. See Houston, 18 U.S. at 31; United States v.
Furlong, 18 U.S. 184, 197 (1820) (“there can be no
doubt that the plea of autre fois acquit would be good
in any civilized State, though resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized
State.”). The Court merely cited its 1847-52 trilogy of
Fox, Marigold, and Moore, and subsequent cases
that rested on them. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 390 (1879) (citing Fox, Marigold, and Moore);
Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.S. 131, 139 (1889)
(citing Fox, Marigold, and Moore); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 209 (1893) (citing Cross);
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Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640, 641 (1898) (citing Cross); Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm’n, 236
U.S. 439, 445 (1915) (citing Cross); Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 330 (1920) (citing Moore); McKelvey v. United States, 260 U.S. 353, 358-59 (1922) (citing Moore).
Between Moore in 1852 and Bartkus in 1959, the
Court addressed the issue at length only once. The
defendants in United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377
(1922) were charged under the then-new Volstead
Act, the federal Prohibition statute, with manufacturing and possessing liquor. They had already been
convicted of the same offenses in Washington state
court, as Washington had a prohibition law of its
own. They moved to dismiss the federal indictment
on the ground that it was barred by the Double
Jeopardy Clause.
When the case reached this Court, the defendants
received abysmal representation. Their counsel filed
a meandering brief, the argument of which was quite
hard to discern, a brief that did not seem to question
the dual sovereignty doctrine. See Brief for the Defendants in Error, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922). Even Solicitor General James Beck was
stumped. “If I correctly understand the argument of
the counsel for the defendant,” Beck politely began,
“he does not question the power of the Federal Government . . . to punish cumulatively a citizen who by
the same act has transgressed both the State laws
prohibiting the manufacture or traffic in liquor and
the national laws.” Reply Brief for Plaintiff in Error
at 1, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
Beck understood Lanza’s counsel to be arguing merely that the intent of Congress in the Volstead Act
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was that a liquor manufacturer should not be punished under federal law if he had already been punished under state law. Id. This was a very weak contention. “It is enough to say,” Beck replied, “that no
section of the Volstead law contains, either expressly
or by implication, any such release of liability.” Id. at
1-2. The Court understood Lanza’s counsel to be
making a different argument: that when states prohibited liquor they were acting under the authority
of the Eighteenth Amendment rather than their own
inherent police power, and that a state prosecution
for manufacturing liquor was therefore tantamount
to a federal prosecution. Lanza, 260 U.S. at 379-80.
This too was a very weak contention, which the
Court rejected unanimously. Id. at 380-82.
The United States was thus the only party in
Lanza to make a coherent argument about dual sovereignty. Before even mentioning any of the cases,
the government’s brief emphasized that a oneprosecution rule would allow a state to nullify national Prohibition. “[I]t is quite obvious that State
and Nation may widely and quite naturally differ” in
their views of Prohibition, Beck noted. Brief for the
United States at 4, United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377 (1922). It was common knowledge that different
parts of the country had radically different attitudes
toward alcohol. In New York, for example, there was
massive disregard of Prohibition right from the
start. Michael A. Lerner, Dry Manhattan: Prohibition in New York City (2007). The potential for nullification was obvious, if a state prosecution barred a
subsequent federal prosecution. “The State, taking
into consideration the more drastic and far-reaching
penalties of the Federal law, might content itself
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with imposing small or even nominal fines,” the government’s brief worried. Brief for the United States
at 4. “As the sentiment for the enforcement of prohibition laws is believed to be inactive in some States,
especially in some subdivisions thereof, it would follow that the State courts would virtually become in
some localities ‘cities of refuge’ . . . from the effective
action of the Federal Government.” Id. at 5. If bootleggers flocked to New York and other “wet” cities,
“[t]he nominal fines of a local magistrate, perhaps
only a justice of the peace, might become the bootlegger’s ‘benefit of clergy.’” Id. at 5. The government
repeated this concern in its reply brief. “[A]s there is
now a wide difference of opinion in various States
with respect to the wisdom and justice of prohibition,” the government cautioned, “it will follow that,
in the States that are called ‘wet,’ the offender, by
submitting to nominal punishments, will escape the
rigor of the Federal laws.” Reply Brief for Plaintiff in
Error at 13.
The Court’s opinion in Lanza duly noted all the
cases establishing dual sovereignty, beginning with
the trilogy of 1847-52, Fox, Marigold, and Moore.
Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382-84. As usual, the Court did
not mention any sources before 1847. Lanza’s inept
counsel had not cited them. (The United States cited
Furlong, not Houston, and erroneously described
Furlong as involving “questions of discretion, not of
power.” Brief for the United States at 18-19 (referring to Furlong by its informal name, U.S. v. Pirates).)
Toward the end of its opinion in Lanza, the Court
acknowledged the concern about Prohibition enforcement that had been emphasized by the Solicitor
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General. “If a state were to punish the manufacture,
transportation and sale of intoxicating liquor by
small or nominal fines,” the Court explained, “the
race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead
guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution
for such acts would not make for respect for the federal statute.” Lanza, 260 U.S. at 385. Prohibition,
like slavery, was an issue as to which states were
certain to nullify federal policy if they were given
half a chance. The purpose of dual sovereignty was
to cut off that opportunity.
* * *
The lesson from this story is that dual sovereignty
was not part of the constitutional design. It is an accident of history. It is a doctrine the Court created
during the slavery crisis that led to the Civil War,
and one the Court reinforced during Prohibition. In
both instances, the Court was responding to the
pressing political issues of the day rather than taking the longer view that constitutional interpretation
often requires.
The Court’s inattention to the early sources has
become particularly unfortunate in recent years, as
the Court has paid closer attention to the original
meaning of the constitutional protections for criminal defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132
S. Ct. 945, 949-50 (2012); Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 42-56 (2004). Defendants today have
weaker double jeopardy protection than they did at
the Founding, when the Double Jeopardy Clause
was understood to bar successive prosecutions by all
sovereigns, not just the sovereign that prosecuted
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first. If judges can weaken constitutional protections
for policy reasons that seem pressing at the time,
one wonders what the Constitution is for.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Court of Appeals should be
reversed.
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